Knowability

Submitted by jhwierenga on Mon, 07/30/2018 - 10:02

One of the major questions in philosophy is this: To what extent can we know anything?

Most discussions of this question, and particularly the philosophical discussions, resemble ancient Greek philosophical discussions on the question as to how many teeth a horse has. All sorts of philosophical arguments were advanced, including in particular the argument that horses, like men, were noble and therefore should have the same number of teeth as them. Nobody thought to find a horse and count its teeth. In the same way, discussions on our ability to know avoid all direct considerations of the nature of the universe. At best, considerations of the nature of the universe appear indirectly, for example in the argument that we function in the universe by means of our senses, therefore the universe is coherent at the level which our senses apprehend it. Such an argument does not tell us anything about what makes the universe to be coherent, for this question can be answered only by an examination of the nature of the universe as such.

Mainstream science does not have much to say about what makes the universe to be coherent. It merely assumes that it must be so. 

QO has a natural explanation for the knowability of the universe, which follows directly from the first principles of QO.